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This paper proposes that a variant of the Battese and Coelli (1995) ineﬃ-
ciency model be applied as a uniﬁed and consistent framework in exploring the
determinants of credit institutions’ proﬁt ineﬃciency scores. To date, work con-
cerned with the potential determinants of credit institutions’ ineﬃciency levels
has addressed the issue in either a single-step or multi-step process. In the for-
mer, ineﬃciency scores are conditioned by region and bank-speciﬁc indicators,
while in the latter, generated ineﬃciency scores are subsequently regressed on
a set of indicators. The approach proposed here allows these issues to be ex-
plored jointly in a statistically consistent manner. The model is applied to a
sample of banks from Ireland, the UK, Canada and Australia.1 Introduction
One prominent feature of studies of credit institution proﬁt ineﬃciency has been an
attempt to delineate the eﬀects on ineﬃciency measures due to institution-speciﬁc
(i.e. bad management) or environment-speciﬁc (i.e. bad luck) factors. Credit
institutions in country Y may have a relatively greater ineﬃciency level vis-` a-vis a
credit institution in country X because of factors speciﬁc to the local economy (say
risk of problem loans, lower economic growth etc.) or because of factors germane
to the institution itself (poor managerial practices). The potential of both of these
factors to impinge on ineﬃciency levels is not in question. However, the manner in
which the issue is explored empirically is.
A brief review of the literature addressing this issue reveals two main approaches
(so called one-step and multi-step approaches). In the one-step approach, the ini-
tial generation of the ineﬃciency score is conditioned by the inclusion of both bad
luck and bad management variables. Berger and Mester (1997), for example, in-
cluded both a bad luck and a bad management variable in their estimated cost and
proﬁt functions. Their evidence, generally, tended to support the bad management
hypothesis i.e., having controlled for bad luck, credit institutions with loan perfor-
mance problems also tended to have high costs and low proﬁts “consistent with
the bad management hypothesis.” This approach is not just conﬁned to paramet-
ric applications, Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002) consider 10 environmental variables in
the non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) model and found that rela-
tively weak macroeconomic performance as suggested by the country-speciﬁc envi-
ronmental indicator coincided with a greater change in the ineﬃciency score of the
institution in question. Thus, they argue that, in order to achieve a cross-country
comparison of ineﬃciency scores on an “equal footing”, one needed to include these
country-speciﬁc variables in the original determination of the score.
In contrast to this ﬁrst-stage approach, Maudos et al. (2002), adopt a multi-
stage approach whereby, ineﬃciency scores are initially estimated parametrically
and the resulting scores are then regressed on a series of variables deemed “po-
tential correlates” of ineﬃciency. These potential correlates include, size variables,
specialisation variables, other characteristics speciﬁc to the bank and characteris-
tics of the markets in which the banks operates. Maudos et al. (2002) found that
certain scale variables, loan to asset ratios, market concentration, higher risk and
1market growth indicators had signiﬁcant and the expected signed impact on in-
eﬃciency scores. Using diﬀerent panel data estimators, Fitzpatrick and McQuinn
(2005) found evidence of a signiﬁcant negative relationship between cost ineﬃciency
scores and loan loss reserves in the same second stage manner.
Signiﬁcant drawbacks can be identiﬁed with both approaches. In the ﬁrst in-
stance, ineﬃciency scores are not directly related to potential correlates of ineﬃ-
ciency. One cannot, for instance, directly estimate the individual eﬀects of either
bad management or bad luck on ineﬃciency levels. In the two-stage approach,
the ﬁrst stage involves the speciﬁcation and estimation of the stochastic frontier
function and the prediction of ineﬃciency eﬀects. This estimation is carried out
under the assumption that these ineﬃciency eﬀects are identically distributed with
one-sided error terms. However, the second stage involves the speciﬁcation of a
regression model for predicted ineﬃciency eﬀects, which contradicts the assumption
of an identically distributed one-sided error term in the stochastic frontier.
As a means of addressing this issue within a uniﬁed and consistent framework,
we propose a variant of the increasingly popular Battese and Coelli (1995) model.1
In short, we believe this stochastic model enables the generation of proﬁt ineﬃciency
levels for a sample of credit institutions, while simultaneously enabling these scores
to be related to a set of explanatory variables.
In the next section we present the Battese and Coelli (1995) ineﬃciency model.
Section three outlines the results of the empirical application and a ﬁnal section
oﬀers some concluding comments.
2 A Stochastic Model of Proﬁt Ineﬃciency
The Battese and Coelli (1995) model simultaneously allows for the generation of
ineﬃciency scores and the regression of these scores on a series of potential explana-
tory variables. The model constitutes an improvement, in consistency terms, on
previous models of ineﬃciency where ineﬃciency scores were estimated in a ﬁrst-
step and subsequently regressed on a series of explanatory variables. The model
was postulated in the context of a stochastic production function. However, we
follow Rahman (2003) and assume that a proﬁt function behaves in a manner con-
1A similar application in an agricultural context was proposed by Rahman (2003).
2sistent with the stochastic frontier concept. Proﬁt eﬃciency, sometimes referred to
as ‘total’ eﬃciency, diﬀers from, cost eﬃciency in that it not only requires techni-
cal eﬃciency and both input and output allocative eﬃciency, it also requires that
technical eﬃciency and both types of allocative eﬃciency be achieved at the proper
scale. Therefore, a credit institution may not be operating on the proﬁt frontier
due to scale ineﬃciency.
For the purposes of this paper we use the alternative proﬁt function speciﬁed
by Berger and Mester (1997).2 Combining the Berger and Mester (1997) proﬁt
function and the Battese and Coelli (1995) ineﬃciency model we get the following
πit = f (Yit,Wit,Ei)e(ηit−Ait), (1)
Ait = Iitρ1 + ψit (2)
where
πit = institution i′s proﬁt in period t,
Yit = vector of outputs,
Wit = vector of input prices,
Ei = country or region-speciﬁc variable,






Ait = non-negative random variable (ineﬃciency) which is assumed to be indepen-
dently distributed, such that Ai is obtained by truncation at zero of the normal
distribution with mean Iitρ1 and variance σ2
A,
ρ = vector of parameters to be estimated,
Iit = vector of variables which may inﬂuence the proﬁt ineﬃciency of a credit insti-
tution,
ψi is deﬁned as the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean and vari-
ance σ2 such that the point of truncation is −Iitρ1. Therefore ψi ≥ −Iitρ1. As
noted by Battese and Coelli (1995), these assumptions are consistent with Ai being






(1) and (2) are estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood estimation.
The likelihood function and its partial derivatives are presented in Battese and
2See Vander-Vennet (2002) for a discussion of the merits of the alternative proﬁt function versus
the standard speciﬁcation in the context of credit institutions.
3Coelli (1993) where the likelihood function is expressed in terms of the variance
parameters σ2 = σ2
ψ + σ2




The key aspect of this system is that both (1) and (2) are estimated simultane-
ously. Therefore, the ineﬃciency model given by (2) will impact on the parameter
estimates obtained in the proﬁt function (1).
2.1 Data
The bank level data used are consolidated data from large commercial banks and
are all sourced from Bankscope3. The data are deﬂated with the relevant consumer
price index (CPI) for each country. We use commercial banks to minimise the risk
that diﬀerences in proﬁt eﬃciency may be due to diﬀerent production technologies
or other eﬀects from being a non-commercial bank. Any institutions with missing
data or implausible values were omitted. In addition, any non-domestic subsidiaries
reporting consolidated accounts from any of the remaining three countries were
also removed to prevent double counting. In countries where mergers had occurred
during the sample period, the institutions concerned were dropped in order not to
bias the results. The institutions used are banks headquartered in four diﬀerent
countries - Canada, the UK, Ireland and Australia. We focus on institutions from
these countries (frequently labelled as ‘Anglo-Saxon’) because of the relatively sim-
ilar nature of the ﬁnancial systems in operation there.4 We are attempting to focus
on cross-country diﬀerentials which are due to exogenous economic conditions and
internal managerial performance rather than on the potential eﬀects on ineﬃciency
levels of inherently diﬀerent banking systems. This left a seven year (1996-2002)
balanced panel of 55 diﬀerent banks - 11 each from Canada and Australia, 5 from
Ireland and 28 from the UK.5
In choosing the inputs, outputs and proﬁts of a credit institution we follow
the approaches of Berger and Mester (1997), Maudos et al. (2002) and Vander-
Vennet (2002). Proﬁts are deﬁned as the diﬀerence between interest plus non-
3Produced by Bureau Van Dijk (BVD).
4International ﬁnancial systems are frequently distingushed between the Anglo-Saxon model
(i.e., the UK, north America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand etc.) and the continental
European model. The diﬀerence between these models lies in the manner in which ownership,
control, and regulation are organised. For more on this see Franks and Mayer (1994).
5The complete list of institutions used is available, upon request, from the authors.
4interest income minus interest and non-interest expenses. We specify two outputs,
(Y1 = total loans Y2 = total other earning assets)6, and three inputs (W3 = price
of labour (total personnel expenses/total assets),7 W4 = price of physical capital
(non-interest expenses - personnel expenses / corrected ﬁxed assets) and W5 =
price of ﬁnancial capital (total interest expenses / total deposits)). We also specify
the dependent variable as ln(π∗) = ln(π + |πmin| + 1), where |πmin| is the absolute
value of the minimum value of proﬁts in the sample. Some credit institutions report
a negative proﬁt. Given our log-linear speciﬁcation, we adjust the proﬁt levels in
the sample such that the proﬁt level for the institution with the largest negative
amount corresponds to log(0+1) = 0. We also seek to minimise the eﬀects of
large scale diﬀerentials amongst the institutions in the sample by normalising both
output variables by an institution’s total assets. Macroeconomic data used in the
analysis are taken from the OECD8. In particular we use the GDP growth rate and
the standardised unemployment rate (the percentage of the civilian labour force).
Sample means for each variable are presented in Table 1 (insert Table 1 here).
3 Empirical Model and Results
The model given by (1) and (2) is estimated by maximum likelihood using FRON-
TIER 4.1 (Coelli (1996)). In specifying a functional form for (1), we adopt the
ﬂexible functional translog proﬁt function for each institution i. The system esti-
mated is as follows
6We also explored the use of oﬀ-balance sheet assets as the second output, however, these
indicators were not avilable for all of the institutions in the sample.
7We use total assets instead of total employees as the relevant denominator owing to the absence
of employee data for many credit institutions in the sample. As noted by Maudos et al. (2002)
this deﬁnition can be interpreted as labour cost per worker adjusted for diﬀerences in labour
productivity as PE/TA = PE/NE × NE/TA where PE is personnel expenses, NE is number
of employees and TA is total assets.
8OECD Economic Outlook Number 75 - Statistical Annex Tables.
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Ijtρ1 + ψit (4)
Along with the standard inputs and outputs in the proﬁt function we also include
three country-speciﬁc dummies, (Ej), for Canada, Ireland and the UK. Thus, we are
allowing for cross-country diﬀerences in the proﬁt levels of the diﬀerent institutions.
Turning to the ineﬃciency model (4), we follow Schmalensee (1985) in adopting
dummy-variables as indicators of ﬁrm-speciﬁc or managerial performance variables.
While others have used the ratio of a credit institution’s loan loss provisions to its
total assets as a proxy for such inﬂuences, we believe the use of ﬁrm-speciﬁc dum-
mies is preferable, particularly, given the panel nature of the data.9 We include 54
dummies, (
P54
j=1 Ii), and exclude the credit institution which had the nearest aver-
age eﬃciency score to the sample average in an earlier run of the model. In order to
capture the potential impact of adverse macroeconomic conditions within a coun-
try we include, in the ‘I’ vector, both the GDP growth rate and the standardised
unemployment rate for each country (
P56
j=55 Ij).10 Finally, we also include country-
speciﬁc dummies in the ineﬃciency model (
P59
j=57 Ij). Thus, we are allowing for
potential diﬀerences in both the level and eﬃciency of proﬁts across countries for the
credit institutions concerned. Consequently, we have 59 variables in the ineﬃciency
model.
9The deﬁnition of speciﬁc and general provisions varies across countries as do banks discretion
in provisions for loans. Provisions tend to be based on historical averages of the institutions,
consequently, they do not exhibit much within-group temporal variation. In addition loss provisions
were not available for all institutions which would have reduced the size of the sample further.
10We also explored the use of output gap estimates for each country. The correlation coeﬃcient
between the GDP and unemployment rates was -0.02 per cent suggesting that multi-collinearity
between these variables was not a potential problem.
6Tables 2 (insert Table 2 here) and 3 (insert Table 3 here) present the results for
the proﬁt function and the ineﬃciency model respectively. For the proﬁt function,
58 per cent of the variables are signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. This compares
quite favourably with other similar-type applications. Results for the three country
dummies suggest that credit institutions from Canada have signiﬁcantly lower proﬁt
levels than those of Australian institutions while UK institutions have signiﬁcantly
higher proﬁt levels. Of interest also in Table 2 is the result for the variance param-
eters - θ in particular. We note that the estimated value of the variance parameter
θ is greater than 0.5 which suggests that eﬃciency eﬀects are likely to be signiﬁcant
in the analysis of institutions’ proﬁt levels across countries.
Table 3 reports the results of the ineﬃciency model. As the dependent variable
is the level of ineﬃciency, a positive coeﬃcient suggests that the variable in ques-
tion increases the level of ineﬃciency. We suppress the results for the bank level
dummies.11 In total 43 per cent of the dummies are signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent
level. Of these coeﬃcients 30 are positively signed while 24 are negative. Both the
‘bad luck’ variables have the hypothesised eﬀect. An increase in the GDP growth
rate for a particular country decreases the proﬁt ineﬃciency of a credit institution.
Conversely, an increase in the unemployment rate in a country increases the level of
ineﬃciency. Table 3 also reports the results of six likelihood ratio tests conducted
on the model. The ﬁrst null hypothesis examines whether ineﬃciency eﬀects are
absent from the model. This is strongly rejected by the data. Tests 4 and 5 examine
whether the ineﬃciency model can be restricted to exclude the bank-level dummies
and the macro variables respectively. In both cases we can reject the null hypothesis
at even the one per cent level. Therefore, our model oﬀers quantitative evidence
of the eﬀects of both of these potential inﬂuences on the level of proﬁt ineﬃciency
within credit institutions. The second likelhood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis
of a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for the proﬁt function vis-` a-vis the more ﬂexible
translog.
In terms of proﬁt eﬃciency levels we also ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant cross-
country diﬀerentials. UK credit institutions appear to be signiﬁcantly more inef-
ﬁcient than their Australian counterparts. A possible explanation for this result
is that the average price of labour is higher for UK institutions than the other
11They are available from the authors upon request.
7countries considered12 The UK component of the sample contains a relatively large
number of institutions with signiﬁcant capital market, private banking, and asset
management operations. This may entail higher proﬁt levels achieved with rela-
tively higher labour input costs. Both sets of country-level impacts for the proﬁt
function and the ineﬃciency model are supported by the results of likelihood ratio
tests 3 and 6 in Table 3.13
A statistical summary of the proﬁt ineﬃciency scores is presented in Table 4
(insert Table 4 here). We split the sample of credit institutions into ‘big’, ‘medium’
and ‘small’ sizes based on the sample averages of the total assets series for each
credit institution.14 As might be expected we ﬁnd that the large category reports
the lowest average size of proﬁt ineﬃciency at 21 per cent of proﬁts, with the
medium and small category reporting similar average scores of 46 and 41 per cent
respectively. Overall, it is evident that a sizeable portion of proﬁts (21 - 46 per cent
on average) is being lost across the sample due to sub-optimal technical, allocative
and scale eﬃciency. The range of results is largest for the small category with an
almost 70 per cent diﬀerence between the largest and the smallest ineﬃciency level.
In terms of comparing our results with previous work, most of the empirical
eﬃciency work on European, (Altunbas et al. (2001)), Australian, (Sturm and
Williams (2004)) and UK institutions, has tended to concentrate on cost eﬃciency.
Amel et al. (2004), provide a comparative review of proﬁt eﬃciency in their dis-
cussion of consolidation within the ﬁnancial sector. They ﬁnd an average level
of proﬁt eﬃciency of about 50 per cent but, these estimates are very sensitive to
speciﬁcation and estimation methods. A comprehensive study for the US (Clark
and Siems (2002)), using stochastic frontier analysis among other techniques, ﬁnds
proﬁt eﬃciency scores ranging from 58 per cent to 69 per cent depending on the
measurement of inputs and outputs.
12The price of labour in UK institutions is, on average, 58 per cent, 20 per cent and 2 per cent
greater than the relative ﬁgures for Irish, Australian and Canadian banks for the sample.
13The signiﬁcance of the country-speciﬁc dummies, particularly in the proﬁt function, may sug-
gest evidence of diﬀerent production technologies across the diﬀerent countries.
14This results in 18 credit institutions in both the big and small category and 19 in the medium
group.
84 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a variation of the Battese and Coelli (1995) model
of ineﬃciency as a means of exploring the proﬁt ineﬃciency of credit institutions.
We believe this approach has the speciﬁc advantage of statistical consistency in
that the stochastic proﬁt function and the ineﬃciency model used are estimated
simultaneously.
Our results suggest that both the commonly hypothesised ‘bad management’ and
‘bad luck’ factors appear to have some inﬂuence on ineﬃciency levels for the present
sample. We diﬀer from previous studies by using institution-speciﬁc dummies as a
means of capturing managerial inﬂuences on eﬃciency. Evidence is also found of
signiﬁcant cross-country diﬀerentials in both the levels and ineﬃciency of proﬁts.
This is an interesting result given that the ﬁnancial systems in the countries are
relatively similar; though doubtlessly diﬀering in terms of magnitude. We also note
that a sample-wide average of 36 per cent of proﬁts is lost due to ineﬃciencies.
Many additional factors can be explored within the ‘I’ vector in the ineﬃciency
model. These include various indicators of market structure such as branch density,
concentration, the presence of non-domestic banks and overall domestic banking
performance. Our application here serves to highlight the potential usefulness of
the model, while paving the way for future work.
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10Table 1: Sample Mean of Variables
Variable Level Unit
Proﬁts 495,231 $ Million
Total Loans 0.1418 Ratio
Other Earning Assets 0.0116 Ratio
Price of Labour 0.0120 Ratio
Price of Physical Capital 0.0465 Ratio
Price of Financial Capital 3.485 Ratio
Ineﬃciency Variables
GDP Growth Rate 3.728 %
Unemployment Rate 6.753 %
Note: N = 385 (55 Institutions × 7 years.) All data is in real terms and is deﬂated by the
relevant country consumer price index, 1995 = 1.
11Table 2: Proﬁt Function Estimates
Dependent Variable: ln(π∗)
Parameter Variable Estimate T-Stat
β0 Constant 19.868 19.828
β1 Total Loans 0.523 0.627
β2 Earning Assets 1.177 2.846
β3 Labour 0.441 1.898
β4 Financial Capital 2.312 4.700
β5 Physical Capital 0.162 0.863
β11 (T. Loans)
2 -0.450 -2.335
β12 T. Loans × E. Assets 0.497 2.606
β13 T. Loans × Labour 0.025 0.241
β14 T. Loans × F. Capital 0.409 2.255
β15 T. Loans × P. Capital -0.065 -0.986
β22 (E. Assets)
2 0.030 0.721
β23 E. Assets × Labour 0.059 1.035
β24 E. Assets × F. Capital 0.234 2.306
β25 E. Assets × P. Capital -0.038 -1.044
β33 (Labour)
2 -0.001 -0.096
β34 Labour × F. Capital 0.168 2.919
β35 Labour × P. Capital 0.047 2.220
β44 (F. Capital)
2 0.157 2.407
β45 F. Capital × P. Capital 0.034 0.772
β55 (P. Capital)
2 0.018 1.768
α1 Canada Dummy -0.127 -2.708
α2 Ireland Dummy 0.077 0.833




Note: N = 385 (55 Institutions × 7 years.)
12Table 3: Ineﬃciency Model Estimates
Dependent Variable: Ait
Parameter Variable Estimate T-Stat
ρ1 − ρ54 Individual Bank Dummies
ρ55 GDP Growth Rate -0.006 -1.022
ρ56 Unemployment Rate 0.0002 0.023
ρ57 Canada Dummy -0.373 -0.989
ρ58 Ireland Dummy 0.258 0.548
ρ59 UK Dummy 0.484 1.776
Hypothesis Tests
Test Hypothesis λ Decision
1 H0 : θ = ρ0 = ... = ρ59 = 0 148.261 Reject H0
2 H0 : β11 = β12 = ... = β55 = 0 469.300 Reject H0
3 H0 : α1 = α2 = α3 = 0 81.878 Reject H0
4 H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = ... = ρ54 = 0 373.752 Reject H0
5 H0 : ρ55 = ρ56 = 0 19.430 Reject H0
6 H0 : ρ57 = ρ58 = ρ59 = 0 256.179 Reject H0
Note: N = 385 (55 Institutions × 7 years.) Bank level dummies are suppressed but
are available from authors upon request. λ is a likelihood ratio statistic calculated as -
2[log(likelihood(H0))-log(likelihood(H1))]. It has an approximate chi-squared distribution
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent constraints under the H0
hypothesis. All tests are at the 1 per cent level.
13Table 4: Proﬁt Ineﬃciency Estimates: Statistical Summary
Big Medium Small
Maximum 0.549 0.715 0.708
Minimum 0.022 0.116 0.012
Mean 0.207 0.457 0.406
Range 0.527 0.599 0.696
St. Deviation 0.175 0.183 0.262
Skewness 0.617 -0.559 -0.250
C. of Variation* 0.843 0.339 0.645
N 126 133 126
Note: * C. = Coeﬃcient of Variation = Standard Deviation / Mean, Range is between
Maximum and Minimum values for each size category.
14